In this paper we consider voting analysis in the political science in connection with B n (or M n {0, 1}), the semigroup of the binary relations on X with n elements. We also consider it in connection with M n (F ) (or B n (F )), the semigroup of all fuzzy binary relations on X. Also we establish a possibility theorem and an impossibility theorem in voting analysis based on preferences in B n and M n (F ).
Introduction
K. J. Arrow [1] introduced the social choice function based on the rational relations. Here the rational relation R is a relation satisfying the following conditions:
1. R is connected ( ⇔ for all x, y ∈ P , xRy or yRx), 2. R is transitive (⇔ for all x, y, z ∈ P , xRy and yRz imply xRz).
Also he studied the possibility theorem and impossibility theorem for social welfare functions. J. B. Kim [5] investigated the fuzzy rational choice functions, and C. B. Kim [4] studied B n (or M n {0, 1}), the semigroup of the binary relations on X with n elements.
Recently in journals there are papers concerning possibility-theorem and impossibility-theorem (See [3, 6, 7, 8] ).
In particular, S. Zahariev [8] considered the correction between the impossibility theorem of Arrow and group choice with fuzzy preference relations.
In this paper, we consider voting analysis in the political science in connection with rational relations and also we establish a possibility-theorem and an impossibilitytheorem in voting analysis based on preferences in B n and M n {0, 1} (or M n (F )), the semigroup of the binary relations on X with n elements. (A preference in M n (F ) will be called a fuzzy preference.)
Preliminaries
In this section, we consider several definitions and theorems.
Definition 2-1. Let X be a set of n distinct elements. Let R be a subset of X × X, and if (a, b) ∈ R, then we often write aRb. We denote the set of all such R by B n . Definition 2-2. If R ∈ B n , then we can have a matrix representation M (R) of R : If X is a finite set, X = {x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n }, then we define M (R) = A = (a ij ) as follows :
Proof. It is easy. 
then we say that (R, f R ) is a a fuzzy relation on X. We denote the set of all fuzzy relations on X by B n (F ). Let (R, f R ) ∈ B n (F ). Then we have a matrix representation of 
Theorem 2-7. M n (F ) forms a semigroup under the product operation given in Definition 2-6.
Proof. It is obvious. 1 , p 2 , . .., p m } by voting. Every one i of the city residents has the right to vote with preference R i as a subset P × P , and we consider R i as a member of B m , the semigroup of the binary relations on P . If i will vote for p j = x on the election day, then we write
We define R(x) = {i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N and R i (x) = x}. If there exists x 0 ∈ P such that |R(y)| ≤ |R(x 0 )| for all y in P and at least one y 0 ∈ P such that |R(y 0 )| < |R(x 0 )|, then we say that x 0 will be elected as new Mayor on the election day. We summarize this as the following theorem. Theorem 2-9. The relation R satisfies the above conditions 1 and 2, i.e., the relation R is rational.
Proof. Clearly, always either |R(y)| ≤ |R(x)| or |R(x)| ≤ |R(y)|
, so that for all x and y, xRy or yRx. Thus R is connect. To show transitivity, suppose xRy and yRz. Then
|R(y)| ≤ |R(x)| and |R(z)| ≤ |R(y)|. Thus |R(z)| ≤ |R(x)| and thus xRz.
Hence R is transitive. Therefore the relation R is rational.
Main Results
In this section we consider voting analysis by fuzzy relations. R = {x, y, z, u, v}) and two mayor candidates P = {x, y}. For t ∈ R, we denote the preference by a 2 × 2 fuzzy matrix,
Example 3-1 ([4]). The MOON-CITY has five persons (denoted by
We define R t (x) < R t (y) if and only if t 11 < t 22 and say that t will vote for y instead of
Also we define R(x) = x 11 + y 11 + z 11 + u 11 + v 11 and R(y) = t∈R t 22 . We shall say that x is winner by Quality if and only if R(x) > R(y) . Let We have a possibility theorem as follows:
Theorem 3-3. Let P = {x, y, ....} be the set of candidates for the Mayor election of the MOON-CITY whose population is N (> 2). Then it is possible for x in P to win as the perfect winner in the Mayor election. 
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Theorem 3-5 (AN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM). Any candidate x can not be the purely perfect winner in the Mayor election. (We assume that the number of candidates is greater than 1).
Proof. If there are candidates more than one, then any candidate x has an opposite candidate y( = x). Thus the fuzzy preference R y has y 11 = 0, which shows that R(x) N < 1, where N is the population. This completes the proof.
